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Policy Points:
 Equitable access to a COVID-19 vaccine in all countries remains a key
policy objective, but experience of previous pandemics suggests access
will be limited in developing countries, despite the rapid development
of three successful vaccine candidates.
 The COVAX Facility seeks to address this important issue, but the
prevalence of vaccine nationalism threatens to limit the ability of the
facility to meet both its funding targets and its ambitious goals for vac-
cine procurement.
 A failure to adequately address the underlying lack of infrastructure in
developing countries threatens to further limit the success of the CO-
VAX Facility.
Context: Significant effort has been directed toward developing a COVID-19
vaccine, which is viewed as the route out of the pandemic.Much of this effort has
coalesced around COVAX, the multilateral initiative aimed at accelerating the
development of COVID-19 vaccines, and ensuring they are equitably available
in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). This paper represents the first
significant analysis of COVAX, and the extent to which it can be said to have
successfully met these aims.
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Methods: This paper draws on the publicly available policy documents made
available by the COVAX initiatives, as well as position papers and public state-
ments from governments around the world with respect to COVID-19 vaccines
and equitable access. We analyze the academic literature regarding access to
vaccines during the H1N1 pandemic. Finally, we consider the WHO Global
Allocation System, and its principles, which are intended to guide COVAX
vaccine deployment.
Findings: We argue that the funding mechanism deployed by the COVAX
Pillar appears to be effective at fostering at-risk investments in research and
development and the production of doses in advance of confirmation of clinical
efficacy, but caution that this represents a win-win situation for vaccine man-
ufacturers, providing them with opportunity to benefit regardless of whether
their vaccine candidate ever goes on to gain regulatory approval. We also argue
that the success of the COVAX Facility with respect to equitable access to vac-
cine is likely to be limited, primarily as a result of the prevalence of vaccine na-
tionalism, whereby countries adopt policies which heavily prioritize their own
public health needs at the expense of others.
Conclusions: Current efforts through COVAX have greatly accelerated the de-
velopment of vaccines against COVID-19, but these benefits are unlikely to
flow to LMICs, largely due to the threat of vaccine nationalism.
A vaccine is viewed as the key to bringing about theend of the COVID-19 pandemic. The sooner a vaccine isavailable, the sooner the world can begin to escape the acute
phase of the pandemic, suppressing mortality and morbidity caused
by infection and restoring a degree of normality to social life and
the global economy. Not only is global equitable access to a COVID-
19 vaccine an important public health tool, but it is also neces-
sary to ensure that all countries can discharge their human rights
obligations.1 In an attempt to accelerate the availability of vaccines
and other tools to combat COVID-19, the World Health Organization
(WHO) established the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelera-
tor, a global initiative designed to harbor international cooperation and
knowledge regarding the pandemic. Specifically, the ACT-Accelerator
is focused on accelerating development in four areas, or pillars: di-
agnostics, therapeutics, vaccines (called COVAX), and health systems
strengthening.
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Although efforts to develop a vaccine are starting to prove successful,
with the development of successful candidates from Pfizer, Moderna,
and AstraZenica/University of Oxford all receiving emergency regula-
tory approval in late 2020, key questions remain about which countries
will have access to these vaccines, when they will get access, and in what
quantities. During the 2009H1N1 influenza pandemic, procurement of
pandemic vaccines was dominated by developed countries, which used
advance purchase agreements to reserve doses ahead of production. This
severely limited the number of doses available in developing countries.2
In addition to accelerating research and development (R&D) through
the ACT-Accelerator, and in an attempt to ensure more equitable access
to vaccines for COVID-19, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations (CEPI); Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; and the WHO formed
the COVAX Facility in early 2020. The COVAX Facility is designed to
address the issues encountered by developing countries during the 2009
H1N1 pandemic by using significant advance market commitments to
secure access to vaccines on their behalf. It also encourages multilateral
cooperation to increase access to vaccines in all participating countries.
This paper argues that the funding mechanism deployed by the
COVAX pillar appears to be effective at fostering at-risk investments
in R&D and the production of doses in advance of confirmation of
clinical efficacy. Indeed, the development of two vaccine candidates
funded by the ACT-Accelerator is testament to this fact. However, this
comes with a caution that the mechanism heavily favors pharmaceutical
companies, for which up-front investment from the COVAX pillar
represents a win-win situation and an opportunity to benefit regardless
of whether their vaccine candidate ever goes on to gain regulatory
approval. The paper then discusses the COVAX Facility, arguing that,
like any multilateral purchasing system, securing a sufficient degree of
interest and participation is essential to its success. It argues that the
COVAX Facility has so far failed to do this, primarily as a result of
the prevalence of vaccine nationalism, whereby countries adopt policies
that heavily prioritize their own public health needs at the expense of
others, and that its success is therefore likely to be limited. The paper
concludes by arguing that the Global Allocation System, designed
by the WHO, fails to address the issues experienced by the Vaccine
Deployment Initiative during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, specifically
the delays in deploying vaccine in developing countries owing to a lack
of preparedness and vaccine utilization infrastructure. It argues that, if
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these issues are not addressed, the COVAX Facility will fail to secure
equitable access to vaccines in developing countries, despite the rapid
development of successful vaccine candidates, because the allocation
framework will be unable to operate as intended.
The Access to COVID-19 Tools
Accelerator
As the severity of the SARS-CoV-2 virus became apparent in the early
part of 2020, focus turned to the rapid development of medical counter-
measures to bring about an end to the pandemic. In April, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 74/274, in which the
assembly acknowledged the crucial role of the WHO in coordinat-
ing the international response and called on member states to increase
R&D funding for tools to combat COVID-19.3 This was followed a few
days later by the launch of the WHO’s ACT-Accelerator. The ACT-
Accelerator brings together a number of international organizations and
provides a platform for the consolidation of funding efforts and resource
sharing. Its goal is to speed up an end to the pandemic by supporting
the development and equitable distribution of tools designed to combat
COVID-19.4 Work and investment across the four pillars—diagnostics,
therapeutics, vaccines, and health system strengthening—is aimed not
just at R&D, but also at ensuring the products created are available for
equitable distribution in all countries around the world.
The most recent figures show that the ACT-Accelerator has raised a
total of $5.8 billion in funding commitments, but faces an immediate
funding gap of $3.7 billion and requires a further $23.7 billion through-
out 2021.5 The ACT-Accelerator is a step in the right direction in terms
of fostering global cooperation to tackle the pandemic. However, the ini-
tiative is yet to secure backing from major powers such as China, India,
and Russia.6
The ACT-Accelerator Vaccines Pillar
Also referred to as the COVAX pillar, the vaccines pillar of the
ACT-Accelerator is convened by CEPI, Gavi, and the WHO and aims
to accelerate the development, manufacture, and delivery of COVID-19
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vaccines in all participating countries.4 The pillar acts as a poolingmech-
anism, combining the resources of all participating countries, which will
share the risks and benefits associated with investment in vaccines for
COVID-19. The COVAX pillar intends to ensure that the most promis-
ing vaccine candidates receive sufficient financial backing, enabling the
pillar to assemble a more diverse portfolio of vaccine candidates than any
country could do alone.7 As noted, the COVAXpillar faces an immediate
funding gap of $3.7 billion from 2020, which the United States has in-
dicated it will fill in the short-term, but does not include the additional
$23.7 billion requested to cover funding needs throughout 2021.5 As
of this writing, it looks unlikely that the pillar will meet its ambitious
funding target. It is not clear how detrimental failure to reach this target
will be on equitable access to vaccines.
The COVAX pillar set out with the lofty ambition to distribute two
billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine worldwide by the end of 2021.8
With this target in mind, the COVAX pillar is focused broadly on
achieving three objectives: (1) rapidly accelerating the development of
vaccines for COVID-19 by providing financial backing to a range of
promising candidates; (2) using push and pull financing mechanisms to
stimulate at-risk investment in manufacturing capacity; and (3) ensur-
ing equitable access to vaccines around the world, including procuring,
allocating, and deploying doses to developing countries through the CO-
VAXFacility (discussed separately). Despite rapid acceleration of vaccine
development resulting in the licensure of two vaccines in the COVAX
pillar vaccine portfolio in late 2020, as we argue later in the paper, the
pillar faces an uphill battle in achieving its goals, particularly in the face
of rising vaccine nationalism.
Accelerating Vaccine Development
The process of developing and gaining regulatory approval for a safe,
effective vaccine against a novel disease can typically take well over a
decade to complete.9 Prior to COVID-19 the shortest development pe-
riod for an entirely new vaccine was four years.10 Despite this, COVAX
set itself the ambitious target of deploying two billion doses before the
end of 2021, which required the vaccine development to be accelerated
significantly. To achieve this, the COVAX pillar invested $2.4 billion
in vaccine R&D, split among a wide portfolio of vaccine candidates
to maximize the chances of a successful candidate being developed in
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the shortest possible time frame.8 The emphasis on expediting this
process in respect to vaccines for COVID-19 resulted in pharmaceutical
companies experimenting with a range of novel, nontraditional vaccine
platforms and technologies, such as mRNA- and adenovirus vector–
based vaccines.11 For example, the AstraZeneca/Oxford candidate is
a viral vector adenovirus-based vaccine,12 and two of the COVAX
pillar’s other portfolio candidates utilize mRNA platforms.12 The
unprecedented effort mounted by COVAX, CEPI, and governments
around the world to accelerate the development of vaccine candidates
for COVID-19 has already borne fruit; two of the vaccine candidates
that formed part of the COVAX pillar’s R&D portfolio have received
licensure in at least one country.
In the first instance, theModerna vaccine received regulatory approval
in the United States and Canada in late December 2020, followed by the
European Union in early January 2021. However, despite the fact that
the Moderna vaccine was funded as part of the COVAX pillar’s R&D
portfolio, COVAX has not contracted for the supply of Moderna vac-
cine. This is likely because distribution of the Moderna vaccine in low-
to middle-income countries (LMICs) is complicated by the fact that the
vaccine, which uses mRNA technology, needs to be stored at −70 de-
grees Celsius. In the most recent 2005 estimate, the WHO concluded
that up to 50% of vaccines are wasted globally every year, in large part
because of lack of temperature control and the logistics to support an
unbroken cold chain.14 This estimate is based on most vaccines needing
to be stored between 2 and 8 degrees Celsius, not −70 degrees Celsius,
which presents what currently appears to be insurmountable challenges
for rapid rollout of the Moderna vaccine in LMICs.
More encouragingly, the COVAX pillar–funded AstraZeneca/Oxford
candidate also received regulatory approval in late 2020, albeit only in
the United Kingdom at present. Being an adenovirus vector vaccine,
this vaccine represents the most viable vaccine for rollout to LMICs be-
cause it can be rapidly manufactured globally, only needs to be stored
between 2 and 8 degrees Celsius, and is priced significantly lower than
the mRNA vaccines currently licensed.15 However, at present, neither
of these vaccine candidates has received WHO prequalification or ap-
proval from the WHO’s Emergency Use Listing (EUL) process, which
enables LMICs to expedite their own regulatory approval processes to
import and administer the vaccine.
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Manufacturing Capacity and “At-Risk”
Production
Despite the fact that the COVAX pillar has successfully accelerated the
vaccine development process and one of the COVAXportfolio candidates
has achieved regulatory approval, making the vaccine available in the
volumes necessary to reach its goals is a significant challenge to COVAX
and its partners. Ensuring adequate and timely manufacturing capacity
for COVID-19 vaccines is essential if COVAX is to meet its target of
distributing two billon doses by the end of 2021, a proposition reflected
in the $7 billion budgeted for “market preparation and manufacturing.”
Of this amount, $6.4 billion was needed before the end of 2020,8 a target
that was not met.
Vaccine production is complex and expensive, and typically manu-
facturers do not risk the investment in scaling up production capac-
ity for vaccines without knowing that their candidate works and has
been approved for commercial sale. However, given the unique circum-
stances of COVID-19, if manufacturers had waited until the efficacy of
their candidate was proven before investing in scaling up manufacturing
capacity, there would have been further delay in making vaccines avail-
able for deployment. The COVAX pillar therefore made an “at-risk” in-
vestment in manufacturing capacity prior to the results of efficacy trials
so that doses of COVID-19 vaccine could be made available as soon as
possible.4 This was achieved with a combination of push and pull financ-
ing mechanisms.4 Push financing consisted of direct, at-risk investment
in global vaccine-manufacturing capacity.16 Pull financing was supplied
in the form of advance market commitments to purchase substantial
volumes of vaccine in the event that a candidate is successful.16 This
approach was intended to encourage vaccine manufacturers to invest in
scaling up manufacturing capacity in two ways: (1) by offering to effec-
tively share the risk of investing in capacity that may never be fully uti-
lized or, more pressingly, be capable of turning a profit; and (2) by offer-
ing commitments to purchase a substantial volume of vaccine in the fu-
ture, which encourages investment in development and manufacturing
by effectively guaranteeing future sales. There is some indication that
this strategy is working; AstraZeneca started production of its vaccine
candidate in June, despite it not being clear at that stage that the vac-
cine would achieve regulatory approval.17 This at-risk production stems
from CEPI investing approximately $383 million, which was used by
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AstraZeneca to increase manufacturing capacity,17 significantly reduc-
ing the gap in time between regulatory approval and delivery of doses.
Ultimately, vaccine manufacturers have little to lose under this ar-
rangement. If the candidate is unsuccessful, the investment wasted in
producing doses at risk will be significantly lower because the financial
risk is being shared with the COVAX pillar. Conversely, if their can-
didate is successful, manufacturers benefit in two ways. First, the doses
produced at risk can be used to begin filling existing purchase orders for
vaccine in a shorter than expected time frame. And second, the increased
manufacturing capacity at a discounted cost (since at least part of the in-
vestment will have been provided by the COVAX pillar) enables them
to complete future orders more quickly.
This argument is equally applicable to the R&D side of the COVAX
pillar, because any contributions made by the pillar effectively reduce
the costs of R&D for the pharmaceutical companies, thereby increasing
the potential for profit if the candidate is successful. This arrangement is
therefore a win-win for pharmaceutical companies, because the COVAX
pillar bears a significant share of the financial risks associated with
failure, leaving the pharmaceutical companies free to profit on the
back of any success. In essence, the arrangement privatizes profit and
socializes risk. However, it would be unfair to consider this as a failure
of the COVAX pillar, because one of its key objectives is to accelerate
the development and manufacture of vaccines for COVID-19, and
these arrangements, as much as they stand to benefit pharmaceutical
companies, have resulted in the fastest-ever development of a vaccine
for a novel pathogen.
Nevertheless, this leaves open the question of value for money in
the development of vaccines for COVID-19; it may be the case that
the amounts that the COVAX pillar and governments around the
world have invested in the R&D of the vaccines in their portfolio are
substantially more than the costs (actual and opportunity costs) paid by
those firms in R&D and expanding manufacturing. If this is the case it
raises significant concerns around the price point and profit margins of
vaccines in the COVAX portfolio, and much wider concerns regarding
how pharmaceutical R&D is incentivized and funded during a health
emergency. Ultimately, it is difficult to answer this question due to
a lack of transparency in the contractual arrangements between gov-
ernments and nongovernmental organizations on the one side and the
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pharmaceutical industry on the other for the development and supply
of COVID-19 vaccines.
Vaccine-manufacturing capacity is physically and geographically lim-
ited, especially with regard to new technological platforms. For exam-
ple, technologies such as the mRNA technology used by Moderna and
Pfizer in their COVID-19 vaccines are not readily found outside of a
small number of high-income countries (HICs).18 With respect to intel-
lectual property (IP) and manufacturing capacity, IP rights are a barrier
to expanding manufacturing capacity for many medical products, espe-
cially solid-dose drugs. Were it not for IP rights, stringently enforced
by their owners, many of the world’s most desperately needed medicines
could be easily and cheaply made by generic manufacturers around the
world. That is not the case for vaccines; it is not patent protection that is
the barrier to introducing generic vaccines, but rather the inaccessibility
of knowledge that is not in the public domain and know-how which is
the true barrier to expanded manufacturing capacity for vaccines.19 As a
result, use of tools such as compulsory licensing of patents (which have
proven successful in expanding access to drugs in developing countries)
do not represent a viable procurement method to rapidly expand access
to a COVID-19 vaccine.20
The COVAX Facility and Equitable
Access
Within the COVAX pillar, which is dedicated to vaccine development,
is the COVAX Facility, an initiative concerned specifically with procure-
ment, allocation, and delivery of vaccines for COVID-19. Participation
in the facility is voluntary and not necessarily linked to participation
in other parts of the ACT-Accelerator or the COVAX pillar. The CO-
VAX Facility has entered a range of agreements with manufacturers for
the supply of COVID-19 vaccines, which it believes will be sufficient
to reach its target of procuring two billion doses by the end of 2021,
approximately half of which will be reserved for deployment in devel-
oping countries.4 To this end, COVAX reports that it has secured “170
million doses of the AstraZeneca/Oxford candidate via an advance pur-
chase agreement”; 200 million doses (and options for up to 900 mil-
lion more) of the AstraZeneca/Oxford or Novavax candidates, via “an
agreement with the Serum Institute of India”; 500 million doses of the
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Janssen candidate, via a “memorandum of understanding” with Johnson
& Johnson; 200 million doses of the Sanofi/GSK vaccine candidate, via a
“statement of intent”; and first “right of refusal for a potential combined
total of over 1 billion doses in 2021 of promising vaccine candidates …
in the COVAX R&D Portfolio.”22
The use of different language to describe these various agreements is
indicative of how firm the commitments actually are. “Memorandum
of understanding” and “statement of intent” can be taken as synonyms
for no formal agreement has yet been reached, but negotiations are un-
derway. It is noteworthy that COVAX differentiates between an “agree-
ment” and an “advance purchase agreement.” As explained earlier, an
advance purchase agreement allows a country, or in this case COVAX,
to reserve doses of a vaccine prior to licensure or the vaccine being de-
veloped, thereby securing priority access as soon as the product becomes
available. It is not clear what “an agreement” is in the context of the CO-
VAX Facility, or how this differs from an advance purchase agreement.
It is expected that vaccine secured via advance purchase agreements will
be supplied before any other agreements (that was certainly the case in
previous pandemics2), and as we elaborate later in the paper, a signifi-
cant amount of the AstraZeneca/Oxford vaccine supply has been reserved
via bilateral advance purchase agreement by HICs. Therefore, it is likely
that the “200 million doses (and options for up to 900 million more) of
the AstraZeneca/Oxford” vaccine from the Serum Institute of India will
be delivered to COVAX in a slower time scale than those secured via
advance purchase agreements by HICs.
By entering advance purchase agreements with manufacturers, the
COVAX Facility aims to prevent a scenario in which developing coun-
tries are reliant solely on bilaterally donated vaccine to immunize their
populations, as was the case during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.2 During
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, developing countries received vaccine much
later and in far smaller quantities than developed countries, which were
able to procure vaccine using their own advance purchase agreements.2
For developed countries, participation in the COVAX Facility represents
the opportunity to diversify their procurement strategy for COVID-
19 vaccines, while also supporting access to vaccines in developing
countries.16 If it is successful, the COVAX Facility has the potential
to significantly improve equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines by ex-
panding access and minimizing delays in their availability in LMICs. If
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it fails, access to vaccines in developing countries and in countries unable
to enter advance purchase agreements will be significantly limited.
The following section explains how the COVAX Facility operates, in-
cluding the distinction between the self-funded group (made up primar-
ily of developed countries) and the funded group (made up of developing
countries).
Funding Arrangements
The way in which countries participate in the COVAX Facility depends
on which group they fall into, based on their financial resources. HICs
and upper middle-income countries (UMICs) are classed by COVAX
as “self-funded,” whereas low-income countries (LIC) and LMICs are
“funded.”7
Self-funded countries engaging with the facility finance vaccines us-
ing their own public finance budgets and are “guaranteed a sufficient
number of doses to immunise 20% of their populations.”7 These coun-
tries provide an up-front payment and a commitment to purchase their
allocated doses through COVAX once they become available. Using
these funds, the facility plans to procure approximately 950 million out
of the targeted two billion doses. However, the procurement arm of CO-
VAX appears significantly underfunded. Although COVAX reports it
“has met its urgent 2020 fundraising target of US$ 2 billion,” it fur-
ther reports “at least US$ 4.6 billion more is needed in 2021 to procure
doses of successful candidates as they come through the portfolio.”22 The
implication is that unless COVAX receives this significant increase in
funding, it will be unable to actively procure doses of vaccine on behalf
of its members. Importantly, self-funded countries are not prohibited
from entering bilateral agreements with pharmaceutical companies and
are encouraged to use the COVAX Facility as an insurance policy to mit-
igate against the risk of securing no vaccine from their bilateral agree-
ments, in the event that the candidates are unsuccessful.21 However, as
we argue in the next section, bilateral advance purchase agreements have
undermined the COVAX Facility by increasing competition for a lim-
ited supply of vaccine, thereby reducing the number of doses available
for timely procurement by the facility.
In contrast, the application process for funded countries required
no up-front payment. The participation of funded countries has been
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supported by the Gavi COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC),
a financing instrument designed to support the procurement and de-
livery of COVID-19 vaccines for developing countries.21 The premise of
the COVAX Facility is to ensure equitable access to vaccines for COVID-
19 by pooling international resources, enabling investment and advance
procurement from a range of vaccine candidates, and sharing the poten-
tial risks and benefits, while mitigating against the risks associated with
countries going it alone in vaccine procurement. The world cooperates to
develop the vaccine and to procure it, meaning that once doses become
available, they can be distributed equitably across the world.
However, the success of the facility is dependent on securing sufficient
backing from the international community, which has not been forth-
coming. This is important for two main reasons: first, as just discussed,
significant financial backing is needed to ensure the facility can meet
its targets for procurement; and second, a more cohesive international
approach to procurement benefits the facility by reducing competition
for doses in the early stages when availability will be limited.
In addition to chronic underfunding, a significant challenge to the
success of COVAX is the reemergence of vaccine nationalism during
COVID-19, whereby developed countries prioritize conducting their
own bilateral agreements with pharmaceutical companies over the mul-
tilateral procurement system.23 Such behavior follows a pattern of na-
tionalist actions taken by countries throughout the pandemic, including
temporary restrictions on travel and trade.24
Participation in the Facility and the Threat of
Vaccine Nationalism
The main threat to the facility securing sufficient participation is the
reemergence of vaccine nationalism, whereby countries prioritize con-
ducting their own bilateral advance purchase agreements with vaccine
manufacturers over participation in multilateral initiatives such as the
COVAX Facility.23 A shift toward vaccine nationalism is evident in the
current pandemic. While 69 countries, plus the EU trading bloc, have
formally joined COVAX, and a further 86 have submitted an expres-
sion of interest in doing so, there are some notable absentees.21 China
and Russia appear to have wholly rejected the COVAX Facility in favor
of pursuing their own bilateral agreements with vaccine manufacturers.
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Further, a significant number of HICs have completed their own bilat-
eral agreements in addition to considering participating in the facility.
One example of this threat is the European Union. EU officials ini-
tially advised member states against joining the facility because they
believed it would lead to “higher prices and later supplies.” The EU
officials also warned that participating in the facility may be incom-
patible with an exclusivity clause signed by its member states.21 This
decision was ultimately reversed in September 2020, and the EU joined
COVAX. However, despite this purported commitment to COVAX, EU
member states will also be able to benefit from advance purchase agree-
ments negotiated by the European Commission using its 2.7 billion-
euro Emergency Support Instrument,25 as well as those negotiated by
the Inclusive Vaccine Alliance (IVA).26 The IVA is an alliance consist-
ing of France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands and has negotiated
an agreement with AstraZeneca for the supply of 300 million doses,
which will be distributed proportionately among EUmember states that
wish to participate.27 This deal has now been ratified by the commis-
sion, which has also concluded agreements with five other companies
to secure at least 1.9 billion doses of vaccine through advance purchase
agreements. While the situation with EUmember states is in fact an ex-
ample of multilateral cooperation to procure vaccines for COVID-19 at
scale, the focus of both the commission and the IVA is to secure equitable
access to vaccines within the EU, rather than in all countries around the
world.
The EU countries are not alone in their decision to pursue advance
purchase agreements outside of the COVAX Facility. The United King-
dom has entered seven advance purchase agreements on its own, poten-
tially securing access to approximately 357 million doses of vaccine.29
Canada has also announced deals with Pfizer and Moderna for “millions
of doses” of their vaccine candidates.30 Both Canada and the United
Kingdom submitted a nonbinding expression of interest in joining the
facility in July 2020,31 but the extent of their own bilateral agreements,
particularly in the case of the United Kingdom, suggests that they are
unlikely to fully commit to, or be reliant on, participating in the facil-
ity to meet their procurement needs. Although the COVAX Facility has
been clear that countries conducting their own bilateral agreements can
use the facility as an “insurance policy,”21 it is difficult to see what more
the facility is capable of offering countries such as Canada and the United
Kingdom that already have advance purchase agreements in place with
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all of the leading candidates. To appeal to countries in this position, the
facility needs to consider how it can offer a more diverse portfolio of
vaccine candidates, while still ensuring that it reaches agreements with
the leading candidates so that the other participating countries, which
are unable to enter their own bilateral agreements, can still benefit from
them.
Under the leadership of President Trump, the United States expressed
no interest in joining the COVAX Facility and was clear from early in
the pandemic that the ambitious Operation Warp Speed was focused on
fulfilling America’s needs first, before going on to assist the rest of the
world.32 As part of Operation Warp Speed, the United States has in-
vested in a range of vaccine candidates. These include a deal with Pfizer
and BioNTech to produce an initial 100 million doses, a deal with As-
traZeneca for 300 million doses, and an agreement with Novavax for “at
least” 100 million doses.32 Under the Biden administration, the United
States has made significant funding commitments to COVAX, although
it continues to agressively pursue its own bilateral agreements over pro-
curement through COVAX.33
In addition to the United States, many developed countries have de-
cided to make monetary donations to the COVAX AMC, but still have
not yet joined the COVAX Facility as a participating country. This is a
further indication that the COVAX Facility has failed to win the support
of these countries. The United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy, and
Sweden have pledged donations totalling approximately $960million,34
but each has only given “non-binding confirmations of intent to partic-
ipate in the COVAX Facility.” These pledges suggest that countries are
willing to fund the COVAX AMC as a mechanism for promoting equi-
table access in developing countries, but have reservations about partici-
pating in the COVAX Facility as the mechanism through which to pro-
cure their own vaccines. This reluctance to rely on the COVAX Facility
for procurement of COVID-19 vaccines, coupled with the willingness
to provide funds directly to the COVAX AMC while pursuing bilateral
advance purchase agreements, suggests that other countries share the
fears expressed by the EU that the facility will fail to deliver vaccines
on the correct time scale and/or at the right price point. This half-in,
half-out approach to multilateral cooperation can only be detrimental to
the COVAX Facility in the long term, and it reinforces fears (discussed
next) that the facility will begin to receive doses only after developed
countries have started to receive their supplies.
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This shift toward vaccine nationalism and the fragmentation of the
global procurement landscape will have a detrimental impact on the ef-
forts of the COVAX Facility and, in turn, equitable access to vaccines
for COVID-19, particularly in developing countries. Given the prolif-
eration of bilateral advance purchase agreements and underfunding of
the COVAX Facility, some HICs (or alliances) will receive priority ac-
cess over others. At this stage, it does not look as though the COVAX
Facility will receive priority over countries that have concluded bilat-
eral purchase agreements. For example, both the United Kingdom and
the facility have reached agreements with AstraZeneca, but the United
Kingdom has already begun to receive its allocation, whereas the CO-
VAX Facility has not, and there is no clear indication of when rollout in
COVAX participating countries will begin.4 Moreover, given the num-
ber of doses secured bilaterally by HICs compared to COVAX, it is clear
that COVAX-reliant countries will receive a significantly smaller num-
ber of doses than HICs with bilateral agreements in place. The issue
of priority access is significant, because countries capable of conduct-
ing their own bilateral agreements are unlikely to engage fully with the
COVAX Facility if doing so will result in delays in receiving doses of
vaccine. Indeed, part of the EU’s initial decision not to engage with the
facility was predicated on the idea that the EU countries are aiming to
start receiving doses in early 2021 and officials believe this schedule is
“not feasible” through the COVAX Facility.35 Hence, the EU contin-
ues to aggressively pursue bilateral agreements, despite “committing to
COVAX.”
If countries that have conducted bilateral advance purchase agree-
ments receive priority access to vaccines for COVID-19, it will be at the
expense of the COVAX Facility. In turn, this will hinder timely access
to vaccines in developing countries because individual countries are pri-
marily concerned with fulfilling their domestic needs, rather than those
of all countries around the world. As developing countries are unlikely to
have the financial resources to commit to advance purchase agreements
themselves,2 it follows that any delay in the COVAX Facility receiving
vaccines will disproportionality affect developing countries. Ultimately,
unless a significant majority of countries are exclusively engaged with
the facility, it becomes just another competitor in the global market for
access to vaccines for COVID-19, albeit one focused on securing global
equitable access, rather than fulfilling domestic need. Unless it can get
to the front of the queue—which current evidence suggests is not the
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case—the facility, and the developing countries reliant on it, will expe-
rience significant delays in securing doses, thereby limiting equitable
access to vaccines.
Allocation and Delivery
When the COVAX Facility begins to receive doses, precisely how they
will be allocated to participating countries depends on whether they
are self-funded or COVAX AMC supported (i.e., funded). As stated
earlier, self-funded countries participating in the facility are “guaran-
teed enough doses to immunise 20% of their population, with doses to
be distributed equitably as they become available.”16 An equal alloca-
tion of doses will be distributed among the funded countries, but how
these are allocated will be governed by the WHO’s Global Allocation
Framework.16
The current proposal would see vaccine delivered in two phases. Dur-
ing phase 1, countries will receive doses proportionally based on their
total population.36 Allocation during this phase will be focused initially
on supplying a sufficient number of doses to immunize health care and
social workers, for which it is estimated countries will need a quantity
of doses equivalent to 3% of population coverage.36 Following this, fo-
cus will shift to immunizing high-risk adults, including the elderly and
adults with comorbidities, until countries have received enough doses to
immunize up to 20% of their populations.36 Phase 2 will allow for cov-
erage beyond the 20% mark and doses will be allocated based on coun-
try need, vulnerability, and the relative threat of COVID-19 within the
population.36 However, the Global Allocation Framework operates on
the fundamental principle that all countries should receive doses at the
same rate to the extent possible.36
Several practical and logistical issues associated with transporting and
deploying vaccines make theWHO’s commitment to delivering doses to
funded countries at the same rate difficult to fulfill. For example, trans-
porting vaccines often requires sufficient cold-chain infrastructure.37 Al-
though the vaccine developed by AstraZeneca will be able to leverage the
standard cold-chain infrastructure, which is currently widely available
in developing countries,38 the vaccines utilizing mRNA platforms re-
quire significantly more sophisticated infrastructure. In addition, global
distribution of vaccines necessitates sophisticated storage facilities that
comply with Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) and are operated
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by appropriately trained employees.37 Although the COVAX Facility
and in particular Gavi have committed to supporting development of
cold-chain infrastructure and readiness of supply chains in developing
countries,16 the reality is that some countries will be better prepared
than others and several WHO member states have expressed concern
about how countries will be prioritized during phase 1 when vaccine
supplies are likely to be severely constrained.36
During the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the WHO established
the Vaccine Deployment Initiative (VDI) to manage the allocation and
delivery of donated influenza vaccines in developing countries. Coun-
tries were prioritized based on their ability to complete the application
process established by the VDI. This involved reaching agreement on
legal issues, such as liability waivers, and completing a comprehensive
“national deployment plan,” demonstrating the countries’ capacity to
utilize doses effectively.2 Prioritizing countries that had sufficient vac-
cine deployment infrastructure reduced the number of doses that may
have been wasted. However, many countries struggled to rapidly pro-
duce a national deployment plan, resulting in significant delays in doses
being delivered. In the African region, the average time between a coun-
try starting the application process and receiving its first doses was
261 days.2 In many cases, this meant that doses arrived only after the
acute phase of the pandemic had passed, at which point they were less
effective.39
Given that supply of vaccines for COVID-19 will also be limited,
it may be necessary for the COVAX Facility to adopt a similar mecha-
nism that prioritizes countries capable of using vaccine in order to pre-
vent doses going to waste. The mechanism used during the 2009 H1N1
pandemic sought to do this by prioritizing countries that were able to
satisfy the application criteria quickly; these were typically the more
advanced countries, which already had some of the necessary infrastruc-
ture in place or were able to make arrangements relatively quickly. The
system therefore penalized countries that were not able to satisfy the ap-
plication process quickly, typically the poorest countries and those that
required significant assistance from the WHO to complete the national
deployment plan.39 A similar mechanism therefore risks penalizing the
very poorest countries lacking sophisticated vaccine utilization infras-
tructure and would frustrate the fundamental principle of the Global
Allocation Framework that countries should receive doses at the same
rate.
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The WHO considered the issue of what happens if a country is “not
ready” to receive vaccine during a member state briefing on August 13,
2020.40 Countries that have fallen behind in terms of allocation will be
caught up by receiving larger doses in subsequent delivery cycles. For ex-
ample, in month 1, countries might receive enough doses to cover 3% of
their populations, followed by a further delivery inmonth 2 to take them
to 7% population coverage. If a country is not ready to receive doses dur-
ing month 1, it will then receive enough doses to reach 7% population
coverage during month 2.40 Although this approach has the potential to
ensure that countries receive a proportional number of doses relative to
their population, it does not address the fact that countries lacking the
requisite vaccine infrastructure will still receive doses later than others.
This approach also assumes that the COVAX Facility will have access
to a sufficient number of doses to make significantly larger deliveries to
some countries in later delivery cycles, something that is impossible to
confirm. This solution attempts to sidestep the issues arising from a lack
of vaccine infrastructure, rather than tackling them directly, and there-
fore fails to address the issues experienced by the VDI during the 2009
H1N1 pandemic.
To avoid inequity of vaccine distribution on the same scale as during
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the COVAX Facility should invest heavily
in scaling up the necessary infrastructure in funded countries so that
doses can begin to be deployed in all countries, at the same rate, as soon
as possible. This is especially required with respect to the mRNA vac-
cine candidates, which need to be kept at −70 degrees Celsius; other-
wise, these vaccines, if they are licensed, will not be able to be rolled
out in developing countries, creating an inequity in product availabil-
ity between developed and developing countries. To date, COVAX has
not contracted for either of the mRNA vaccines that have received
licensure (i.e., the Moderna and Pfizer vaccines). However, as part of the
COVAX pillar’s R&D portfolio, the organization has invested in bring-
ing the Moderna candidate to market. This raises questions about the
disconnect between COVAX as a mechanism to incentivize R&D for
COVID-19 vaccines and its role as procurement agent for developing
countries.
Widespread improvements in vaccine infrastructure in funded coun-
tries would reduce the need for an allocation mechanism that priori-
tizes countries based on their readiness to utilize vaccine, allowing for
more equitable distribution of doses in line with the fundamental goal
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of the Global Allocation Framework. In the long term, this investment
would improve the readiness of the funded countries to deal with fu-
ture pandemics, as well as routine immunization campaigns. Therefore,
just as the facility aims to encourage the manufacturing of vaccines at
risk, it should also encourage and support at-risk development in vac-
cine delivery infrastructure. Without this, the significant funds being
invested in the accelerated development and manufacturing process will
benefit only those countries that already have sufficient infrastructure
in place.
Conclusion
The COVAX Facility represents a significant attempt to facilitate mul-
tilateral cooperation to procure vaccines for COVID-19 and to distribute
those vaccines equitably, in all countries around the world. This paper
has explained how the facility intends to meet its ambitious target of
distributing two billion doses of vaccine across all participating coun-
tries before the end of 2021, exploring the issues with its at-risk funding
strategy and the barriers it faces in fostering such a significant interna-
tional collaboration.
Three main arguments have been put forth. The first concerns the
facility’s at-risk funding strategy, in particular the way in which it creates
a win-win situation for pharmaceutical companies. Increasing vaccine-
manufacturing capacity and accelerating the availability of vaccines for
COVID-19 should undoubtedly be considered a public good, but the
risks associated with the facility’s at-risk financing strategy should not
be underestimated. Indeed, given the fact that two vaccine candidates in
the COVAX pillar’s R&D portfolio have received emergency licensure
suggests that the COVAX pillar has been successful in accelerating the
development of COVID-19 vaccines. However, the same cannot be said
of COVAX as a procurement tool for LICs and LMICs.
The second argument is that the prevalence of vaccine nationalism
appears to be limiting the participation of some of the world’s wealth-
iest countries in COVAX. These countries have pursued bilateral ad-
vance purchase agreements with the vaccine manufacturers, placing
those countries in direct competition with the COVAX Facility for doses
when they become available. This act of countries hedging their bets rep-
resents an existential threat to the facility and puts its mission in peril.
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The final argument is that the current Global Allocation Framework,
as envisioned by the WHO, will be insufficient in two regards: (1) in
facilitating the facility’s two billion-dose target; and (2) in abiding by
its own “fundamental principle” that countries will receive doses at the
same rate. The reality is that the facility will be unable to deliver doses
to countries at the same rate because not all countries have in place the
necessary infrastructure to deploy and utilize doses effectively. This is an
issue that hampered the operation of the VDI during the 2009 H1N1
pandemic, and it is one that, we argue, should receive urgent attention
in the current pandemic. Unless the disparity in vaccine deployment in-
frastructure is addressed, the facility’s efforts will benefit only wealthier
countries that already have sufficient infrastructure in place, and access
to vaccines for COVID-19 in developing countries will be delayed.
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